With rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI), militaries around the world have been increasingly integrating autonomous and automated features into weapons systems (Boulanin & Verbruggen, 2017Boulanin, V., & Verbruggen, M. (2017). Mapping the development of autonomy in weapons systems. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf. [Google Scholar]).¹1 While military autonomy and automation are not new phenomena, advances in AI-based technologies are said to enable the integration of autonomous and automated features into weapons systems.View all notes The weaponization of AI is often described as a key trend for current and future warfare (Garcia, 2018Garcia, D. (2018). Lethal artificial intelligence and change: The future of international peace and security. International Studies Review, 20(2), 334–341. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy029 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]; Haas & Fischer, 2017Haas, M. C., & Fischer, S. C. (2017). The evolution of targeted killing practices: Autonomous weapons, future conflict, and the international order. Contemporary Security Policy, 38(2), 281–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1336407 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Payne, 2021Payne, K. (2021). I, warbot: The dawn of artificially intelligent conflict. Hurst. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]). As the delegation of tasks to algorithms further progresses, autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are predicted to become a more important part of the modern battlefield. AWS can be defined as systems which “select and apply force to targets without human intervention” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2021ICRC. (2021). ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems. [Google Scholar]). These technological developments have raised concerns among experts in international law, international security, ethics, as well as industry specialists working with AI and its applications. The discussion about the multidimensional impacts of weaponized AI has reached the United Nations (UN), where states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) began to debate the issue informally in 2014 and subsequently established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).²2 This article will generally employ the term autonomous weapons systems (AWS), a category describing systems which weaponize AI and have the potential to use force without immediate human control. The debate at the UN officially uses the term LAWS as it focuses on the lethality of autonomous weapons. When referring specifically to the debate at the UN CCW, or when quoting directly from Russian statements at the UN CCW, the term LAWS will be employed in order to be consistent with the terminology from official documents and statements.View all notes

The Russian Federation is an important participant of the debate on AWS at the UN CCW. Russian delegations have been actively involved in the work of the GGE and have clearly voiced their position on the issue.³3 The Russian Federation has taken part in all GGE meetings, except in 2020.View all notes Due to its consistent opposition to legally binding instruments prohibiting the use and development of AWS, Russia received much attention from campaigners and experts who argue for regulations, such as a treaty, an additional sixth protocol to the CCW, or other positive legal obligations on maintaining human control over the use of force. The non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch (2019Human Rights Watch. (2019). ‘Killer robots’: Russia, US oppose treaty negotiations. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/19/killer-robots-russia-us-oppose-treaty-negotiations. [Google Scholar]), for instance, singled out Russia as one of the states “preventing efforts to start negotiations on a new treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force.” The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2019Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. (2019). Russia, United States attempt to legitimize killer robots. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/russia-united-states-attempt-to-legitimize-killer-robots/. [Google Scholar]) said that Russia is pursuing “a losing fight against the inevitable treaty that’s coming for killer robots” (a colloquial term for AWS). The media also often highlights Russia’s position as one of the actors preventing progress in arms control for autonomous weapons (Gayle, 2019Gayle, D. (2019). UK, US and Russia among those opposing killer robot ban. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/mar/29/uk-us-russia-opposing-killer-robot-ban-un-ai. [Google Scholar]; Nicholls, 2021Nicholls, D. (2021). Killer robots need “no new rules” about firing on humans, Russia tells UN. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/08/03/killer-robots-need-no-new-regulations-firing-humans-russia-tells/. [Google Scholar]; Paul, 2022Paul, J. (2022). Russia “torpedoes” deal to stop “slaughterbots” being unleashed as war fears soar. The Daily Express. https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/1545395/russia-torpedoes-slaughterbots-ukraine-war-ai-technology-un-usa. [Google Scholar]; Tucker, 2017Tucker, P. (2017). Russia to the United Nations: Don’t try to stop us from building killer robots. Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/russia-united-nations-dont-try-stop-us-building-killer-robots/142734/. [Google Scholar]). The Russian delegation’s unwillingness to make progress in the discussion at the GGE in March 2022 aggravated these perceptions (Zeitchik, 2022Zeitchik, S. (2022). The future of warfare could be a lot more grisly than Ukraine. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/autonomous-weapons-geneva-un/. [Google Scholar]).

The CCW takes decisions based on consensus, considered “as the absence of objection rather than a particular majority” (United Nations, 2005United Nations. (2005). Chapter VI: Selected legal opinions of the secretariats of the United Nations and related intergovernmental organizations. In United Nations juridical handbook (pp. 435–502). United Nations. https://legal.un.org/unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/by_chapter/chpVI/2005/chpVI.pdf. [Google Scholar], p. 457). This principle de facto gives individual states the power to veto proposals they object to (Docherty, 2021Docherty, B. (2021). Countering consensus through humanitarian disarmament: Incendiary weapons and killer robots. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/21/countering-consensus-through-humanitarian-disarmament-incendiary-weapons-and-killer. [Google Scholar]). Progress in the GGE debate therefore requires Russia’s agreement. To evaluate the prospects of developing international regulations or prohibitions of autonomous weapons, we need to explore the underlying logics of the Russian position. The Russian Federation is a developer of weapons systems with autonomous and automated features, an active state party in the CCW meetings, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as a possessor of nuclear weapons. A thorough study of the evolving Russian position at the CCW is an important contribution to the emerging academic literature about the potential for global governance and arms control in relation to autonomous weapons (Krishnan, 2009Krishnan, A. (2009). Automating war: The need for regulation. Contemporary Security Policy, 30(1), 172–193. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260902760397 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Google Scholar]; Maas, 2019Maas, M. M. (2019). How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(3), 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1576464 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Rosendorf, 2021Rosendorf, O. (2021). Predictors of support for a ban on killer robots: Preventive arms control as an anticipatory response to military innovation. Contemporary Security Policy, 42(1), 30–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1845935 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Rosert & Sauer, 2021Rosert, E., & Sauer, F. (2021). How (not) to stop the killer robots: A comparative analysis of humanitarian disarmament campaign strategies. Contemporary Security Policy, 42(1), 4–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). It also provides knowledge for actors who seek new regulations on AWS and guidance for their responses and strategies in the ongoing debate at the UN.

Russia’s position on AWS is often interpreted from a purely rationalist or strategic perspective. Many argue that the Russian leadership wants to pursue an unrestricted development of weaponized AI to join the global technological race and compete with the United States and China, gain relative power or strategic advantage, or project power other than via the possession of nuclear weapons (Jankowski, 2021Jankowski, D. P. (2021). Russia and the technological race in an era of great power competition. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-technological-race-era-great-power-competition. [Google Scholar]; Morgan et al., 2020Morgan, F. E., Boudreaux, B., Lohn, A. J., Ashby, M., Curriden, C., Klima, K., & Grossman, D. (2020). Military applications of artificial intelligence: Ethical concerns in an uncertain world. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3139-1.html. [Google Scholar], chapter 6). These views are supported by the oft-quoted citation from Russian President Vladimir Putin that whoever masters AI will become “the ruler of the world” (CNBC, 2017CNBC. (2017). Putin: Leader in artificial intelligence will rule world. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/putin-leader-in-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world.html. [Google Scholar]). While acknowledging these arguments, this article emphasizes the importance of investigating the deeper sources of strategic and material interests. To complement existing rationalist analyses, the article explores ideational logics underpinning the Russian position, especially the role of identity, conceptualized as the self-understanding of Russia and its place in the world (Wendt, 1999Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar], pp. 224–225). Starting from the premise that the Russian leadership conceives of Russia as a great power in the modern world order (Clunan, 2009Clunan, A. (2009). The social construction of Russia’s resurgence: Aspirations, identity, and security interests. Johns Hopkins University Press. [Google Scholar]; Hopf, 2002Hopf, T. (2002). Social construction of international politics: Identities and foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]), this paper tackles the following question: In what way is great power identity guiding Russia’s position on AWS? Based on an analysis and interpretation of Russia’s evolving position at the UN, I argue that Russia’s self-perception as a great power and two integral foreign policy principles—promoting multipolarity (a world order based on multiple poles of power) and ensuring its equal participation in global governance (Russia’s desire to be taken into consideration by others, especially other great powers)—are reflected in the Russian discourse within the UN CCW context.

This article makes an empirical contribution by examining the Russian arguments in the international debate about AWS. There has been an increased interest toward reports and publications about the development of AI in Russia (Bendett, 2019Bendett, S. (2019). The development of artificial intelligence in Russia. In N. D. Wright (Ed.), Artificial intelligence, China, Russia, and the global order (pp. 168–177). Air University Press. [Google Scholar]; Bendett et al., 2021Bendett, S., Boulègue, M., Connolly, R., Konaev, M., Podvig, P., & Zysk, K. (2021). Advanced military technology in Russia: Capabilities and implications. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/03-putins-super-weapons. [Google Scholar]; Dear, 2019Dear, K. (2019). Will Russia rule the world through AI? Assessing Putin’s Rhetoric Against Russia’s Reality. RUSI Journal, 164(5–6), 36–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1694227 [Google Scholar]; Edmonds et al., 2021Edmonds, J., Bendett, S., Fink, A., Chesnut, M., Gorenburg, D., Kofman, M., Stricklin, K., & Waller, J. (2021). Artificial intelligence and autonomy in Russia. Center for Naval Analyses. https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai. [Google Scholar]; Petrella et al., 2021Petrella, S., Miller, C., & Cooper, B. (2021). Russia’s artificial intelligence strategy: The role of state-owned firms. Orbis, 65(1), 75–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.11.005 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]). However, there is no detailed survey of Russian statements on AWS within the UN CCW context, a gap which this article seeks to address, given that Russia is one of the most engaged actors in the discussion and one of the key players in international security. Theoretically, the article develops our understanding of the pursuit of military applications of AI by integrating concepts from constructivist scholarship in International Relations (IR). It provides a complementary analysis to the rationalist-based explanations which attribute Russia’s pursuit of weaponized AI to the desire for relative power or strategic advantage. It does so by showing that the perception of the country’s great power identity makes it “conceptually imaginable and politically possible” for the Russian leadership to conceive of autonomous weapons in this way (Budnitsky, 2020Budnitsky, S. (2020). Russia’s great power imaginary and pursuit of digital multipolarity. Internet Policy Review, 9(3), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.3.1492 [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 4). This paves the way for further studies about how identity factors can take the center stage in analyzing actors’ positions on AWS.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents an overview of rationalist analyses of the Russian position on AWS. The second section develops a complementary theoretical argument by highlighting two foreign policy concepts that are integral parts of Russian great power identity: the promotion of multipolarity and the desire to be recognized as an equal great power. Based on these concepts, in the third part I interpret Russian written submissions and verbal statements (via audio recordings) from the GGE on LAWS and other UN CCW meetings from 2014 to March 2022. The selected written and audio documents analyzed in this paper represent the official Russian position on this issue in the international arena. Focusing on three themes (the global governance of AWS, the concept of human control, and technology more broadly), I show how Russia’s self-perception as a great power and its integral concepts are reflected in Russia’s position on AWS. I conclude by drawing out the implications of this finding for the global debate on autonomous weapons and where it could be headed next. Given that Russia’s understanding of this issue relies on the Russian leadership’s intractable vision of Russia as an equal great power in a multipolar world, it is unlikely to change its position. For advocates of an international ban on the development and use of AWS, convincing the Russian leadership is likely to remain a challenging task.

Rationalist analyses of Russia’s position

Since the mid-2000s, the Russian Federation has been investing significant resources and efforts into modernizing the technology available to its armed forces (Wegener, 2021Wegener, S. (2021). Introduction to the issue of the Russian armed forces’ military capability. In N. B. Poulsen, & J. Staun (Eds.), Russia’s military might – A portrait of its armed forces (pp. 175–194). Djøf Publishing. [Google Scholar], p. 188). Increasing levels of automation and autonomy in its weapons systems, military analysis, and decision-making has been a priority of these modernization efforts (Nadibaidze, 2022Nadibaidze, A. (2022). Russian perceptions of military AI, automation, and autonomy. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/russian-perceptions-of-military-ai-automation-and-autonomy/. [Google Scholar]). One area of interest is the development, testing, and use of robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles. Russian armed forces are already at an advanced stage in terms of research and development (R&D) in military robotics (Allik et al., 2021Allik, S., Fahey, S., Jermalavičius, T., McDermott, R., & Muzyka, K. (2021). The rise of Russia’s military robots: Theory, practice and implications. International Centre for Defence and Security. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICDS-Analysis_The-Rise-of-Russias-Military-Robots_Sten-Allik-et-al_February-2021.pdf. [Google Scholar]). They field several systems with automated and autonomous features which are not classified as AWS. They have tested some of these prototype systems in combat areas such as the war in Syria (Engvall, 2021Engvall, J. (2021). Russia’s military R&D infrastructure: A primer. Swedish Defence Research Agency. https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R–5124–SE. [Google Scholar], p. 40) or during strategic exercises (Russian News Agency TASS, 2021aTASS. (2021a). Uran-9, Nerekhta robots used in troops formations for first time at Zapad-2021 drills. https://tass.com/defense/1337237. [Google Scholar]). In December 2020, Putin declared that technologies such as uncrewed aerial vehicles and automated control systems would be priorities for the Russian military (Vedomosti, 2020Vedomosti. (2020). Путин оценил роль искусственного интеллекта в войнах будущего. https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2020/12/21/851812-putin-otsenil-rol-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-v-voinah-buduschego. [Google Scholar]), while the Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a first robotic military unit in April 2021 (McDermott, 2021McDermott, R. (2021). Moscow forming first robotic military units. Eurasia Daily Monitor. https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-forming-first-robotic-military-units/. [Google Scholar]). The Russian leadership is also visibly interested in military applications of AI to reach higher levels of autonomy (Konaev, 2021Konaev, M. (2021). Military applications of artificial intelligence: The Russian approach. In M. Boulègue (Ed.), Advanced military technology in russia: Capabilities and implications (pp. 63–74). Chatham House. [Google Scholar]; Wachs, 2021Wachs, L. (2021). Revival of the ‘dead hand’? Russian political and military elites’ debates on AI and autonomy in conventional and nuclear forces. In A. Alecsandru (Ed.), The 2021 UK PONI papers (pp. 11–18). Royal United Services Institute. [Google Scholar]). Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov stated that AI-based technologies are a “priority area” and “necessary for the creation of advanced models of weapons, military, and special equipment” (Government of Russia, 2021Government of Russia. (2021). Юрий Борисов провёл совещание о развитии технологий искусственного интеллекта в интересах обороны. http://government.ru/news/41953/. [Google Scholar]).

While Russia can be considered one of most active developers of uncrewed and robotic systems, its AI capabilities, in terms of research, education, patents, and publications at influential conferences, are evaluated to be lacking in comparison with its ambitions (Haner & Garcia, 2019Haner, J., & Garcia, D. (2019). The artificial intelligence arms race: Trends and world leaders in autonomous weapons development. Global Policy, 10(3), 331–337. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12713 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 334). As noted by many analysts, Russia’s AI potential, both civilian and military, is behind those of the United States and China (Horowitz et al., 2018Horowitz, M. C., Allen, G. C., Kania, E. B., & Scharre, P. (2018). Strategic competition in an era of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelligence. [Google Scholar], p. 16). Russia has relatively less educational and scientific resources, as well as less financial investment going into AI R&D (Adamsky, 2014Adamsky, D. (2014). Defense innovation in Russia: The current state and prospects for revival. IGCC Defense Innovation Briefs. https://escholarship.org/content/qt0s99052x/qt0s99052x_noSplash_c6bb01c7155b377e87104c036b7af828.pdf?t=nkzueo. [Google Scholar]; Petrella et al., 2021Petrella, S., Miller, C., & Cooper, B. (2021). Russia’s artificial intelligence strategy: The role of state-owned firms. Orbis, 65(1), 75–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.11.005 [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 78). It is also largely reliant on hardware produced abroad (Dear, 2019Dear, K. (2019). Will Russia rule the world through AI? Assessing Putin’s Rhetoric Against Russia’s Reality. RUSI Journal, 164(5–6), 36–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1694227 [Google Scholar], p. 52). The economic sanctions imposed on Russia and the suspension of scientific collaborations following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have aggravated these challenges, especially the “brain drain” of AI and computer science specialists leaving Russia (Vanian, 2022Vanian, J. (2022). Invading Ukraine has upended Russia’s A.I. ambitions—and not even China may be able to help. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2022/03/25/russia-ai-sanctions-ukraine-china/. [Google Scholar]).

This state of affairs leads many to interpret the Russian Federation’s position on AWS through a rationalist and strategic, interest-based perspective. In this view, the Russian leadership has recognized that developing military AI is key to joining and participating in the so-called global technology race, in which Russia lags behind the United States and China (Horowitz et al., 2018Horowitz, M. C., Allen, G. C., Kania, E. B., & Scharre, P. (2018). Strategic competition in an era of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelligence. [Google Scholar], p. 15; Nocetti, 2020Nocetti, J. (2020). The outsider: Russia in the race for artificial intelligence. Russie.Nei.Reports, no. 34, Institut français des relations internationales. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/outsider-russia-race-artificial-intelligence. [Google Scholar], p. 27). The desire to pursue weaponized AI without any internationally imposed restrictions is framed as part of Russia’s ongoing strategic competition against, and aim to catch up with, its geopolitical rivals. For instance, Polyakova (2018Polyakova, A. (2018). Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. [Google Scholar]) writes that “Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on.” Zysk (2020Zysk, K. (2020). Defence innovation and the 4th industrial revolution in Russia. Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(4), 543–571. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1856090 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Google Scholar]) argues that for Moscow, “joining the ‘technological race’ seems therefore less a choice than an existential inevitability” (p. 2). AI is perceived as a “significant force multiplier” and an important strategic advantage in military operations (Bendett, 2017Bendett, S. (2017). Red robots rising: Behind the rapid development of Russian unmanned military systems. The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/12/12/red-robots-rising-behind-the-rapid-development-of-russian-unmanned-military-systems. [Google Scholar]). As Kozyulin (2019aKozyulin, V. (2019a). Militarization of AI from a Russian perspective. The Stanley Center for Peace and Security. https://stanleycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/MilitarizationofAI-Russia.pdf. [Google Scholar]) points out, “Russia cannot afford to save on military AI because today’s savings could result in a catastrophic strategic loss tomorrow” (p. 6). Based on such assumptions, Russia’s position against a ban on AWS follows from its rationalist quest to compete with others or to retain the opportunity of developing its capabilities without restrictions.

Rationalist domestic factors are also often mentioned as explanations for Russia’s stance. Markotkin and Chernenko (2020Markotkin, N., & Chernenko, E. (2020). Developing artificial intelligence in Russia: Objectives and reality. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82422. [Google Scholar]) note that the Russian position against a potential ban on AWS “proceeds from efforts to lobby the interests of the domestic defense industry and is in line with the behavior of most countries that produce unmanned vehicles.” Others list factors such as Russia’s large territory and border, a decreasing defense budget, high personnel costs and “concerns about disloyalty or incompetence in the lower ranks” (Morgan et al., 2020Morgan, F. E., Boudreaux, B., Lohn, A. J., Ashby, M., Curriden, C., Klima, K., & Grossman, D. (2020). Military applications of artificial intelligence: Ethical concerns in an uncertain world. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3139-1.html. [Google Scholar], pp. 84–85). In summary, a development of AI capabilities without limitations from international conventions is portrayed as being important for Russia to pursue its security interests, which include engaging in a technological competition with the United States and China, gaining strategic benefits, projecting power, satisfying the defense industry, or addressing domestic geographic and financial conditions. Weaponized AI is portrayed as a means to these ends (Nocetti, 2020Nocetti, J. (2020). The outsider: Russia in the race for artificial intelligence. Russie.Nei.Reports, no. 34, Institut français des relations internationales. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/outsider-russia-race-artificial-intelligence. [Google Scholar], p. 25). In the rationalist view, the Russian position at the UN CCW is based on the pursuit of material and security objectives. The Russian leadership is visibly interested in the opportunity to develop more advanced forms of military AI and robotics. Russia’s insistence that new regulations are not necessary and the vague understanding of AWS it has put forward are signs of its quest “to keep as much room for maneuver as possible to determine what constitutes responsible use of military AI” while it can continue its technological developments (Boulanin et al., 2020Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Carlsson, M. P. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/other-publications/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk. [Google Scholar], p. 47).

However, if the Russian leadership was acting exclusively upon rationalist motivations and if it perceived itself lagging in terms of weaponized AI development, it would also be logical to expect Russia to support some international regulation of AWS to limit the technological developments of those who it perceives to be its competitors. If states’ positions on preventive arms control in relation to AWS were guided by their “assessment of their position as potential winners or losers” (Rosendorf, 2021Rosendorf, O. (2021). Predictors of support for a ban on killer robots: Preventive arms control as an anticipatory response to military innovation. Contemporary Security Policy, 42(1), 30–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1845935 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 35), and Russia perceived itself as a laggard in military AI innovation, it would rationally be arguing for some limitations on the use and development of these technologies. As this is not the case, this article adopts another lens, suggesting that socio-cultural factors behind Russia’s position on AWS, in addition to the existing focus on strategic interests and material factors, help us to better understand the full depth of Russia’s position.

While not dismissing the role of the Russian leadership’s strategic interests and pursuit of power and material gains, this article argues that a purely rationalist perspective does not explore the deeply rooted beliefs and ideas guiding Russian policymakers in their perceptions of the costs and benefits of regulating AWS. To paint the full picture of the Russian position, this analysis does not take security or strategic interests for granted. Rather, it investigates these interests’ sources and origins, as well as how they were made possible by emphasizing ideational factors. Inspired by the constructivist literature in IR scholarship, which gives importance to ideas, beliefs, and “collectively held intersubjective understandings,” I propose an identity-focused approach towards the Russian position in the AWS debate (Checkel, 1998Checkel, J. T. (1998). The constructivist turn in international relations theory. World Politics, 50(2), 324–348. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100008133 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 341). One of the main tenants of constructivism is to not take state interests as a given, but to explore how “particular interests come to be” and where these interests come from (Finnemore, 1996Finnemore, M. (1996). National interests in international society. Cornell University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]; Hopf, 1998Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International Security, 23(1), 171–200. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.171 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 176). An ideational-based analysis highlights how Russia’s position on AWS is rooted in its great power identity and two of its constant and integral elements: the promotion of multipolarity and Russia’s quest to ensure its equal participation in global governance.

Russian great power identity

The ambition to be recognized as a great power and a sovereign equal by other great powers has been a “key driver of Russian foreign policy” throughout its history, including following the collapse of the Soviet Union and especially since Putin became president in 2000 (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019Gurganus, J., & Rumer, E. (2019). Russia’s global ambitions in perspective. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067. [Google Scholar]; Neumann, 2008aNeumann, I. B. (2008a). Russia’s standing as a great power, 1494–1815. In T. Hopf (Ed.), Russia’s European choice (pp. 13–34). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230612587_2. [Crossref], [Google Scholar], 2008bNeumann, I. B. (2008b). Russia as a great power, 1815-2007. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 128–151. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2008.7 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Trenin, 2009Trenin, D. (2009). Russia’s spheres of interest, not influence. The Washington Quarterly, 32(4), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903231089 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 4). While the Russian elite may not agree on the exact sources of “great powerness,” the self-identification as one of the major powers in the world order brings together all schools of Russian foreign policy thought and is a constant feature of Russian identity (Hopf, 2005Hopf, T. (2005). Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia’s great power identities and military intervention in Abkhazia. Review of International Studies, 31(June), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050500687X [Crossref], [Google Scholar]; Lo, 2015Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Brookings Institution Press. [Google Scholar], p. 47; Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2021Tsygankov, A. P., & Tsygankov, P. A. (2021). Constructing national calues: The nationally distinctive turn in Russian IR theory and foreign policy. Foreign Policy Analysis, 17(4), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab022. [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 4). This self-perception is visible in the discourse found in official documents, political leaders’ speeches, and national strategies. The 2000 National Security Concept, signed by then Acting President Putin, names “the strengthening of Russia’s position as a great power and one of the influential centers of the multipolar world” as one of the key national interests in the international sphere (Consortium Kodex, 2000Consortium Kodex. (2000). Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 10.01.2000 г. № 24 О Концепции национальной безопасности Российской Федерации. https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901751578. [Google Scholar]). In 2020, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that this foreign policy course set by Putin in 2000 has allowed:

[us] to restore our status as a great power … —the status of a key player on major international problems, the status of a country without which, according to all our partners, including the Western countries that have announced sanctions, who are now talking about the need to continue a tough course towards Moscow—they all confirm that it is difficult, if not impossible, to solve problems in the world without Russia. (Dolgopolov & Shestakov, 2020Dolgopolov, N., & Shestakov, E. (2020). Открытый дипломат. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. https://rg.ru/2020/02/10/sergej-lavrov-prodolzhaetsia-srashchivanie-nato-s-evrosoiuzom.html. [Google Scholar])

The 2021The Guardian. (2021). US rejects calls for regulating or banning ‘killer robots.’ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/02/us-rejects-calls-regulating-banning-killer-robots. [Google Scholar] version of the National Security Strategy also maintains the position that Russia needs to strengthen its role as one of the influential centers of the modern world (Consortium Kodex, 2021Consortium Kodex. (2021). Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 02.07.2021 г. № 400 О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации. https://docs.cntd.ru/document/607148290. [Google Scholar]). Numerous studies examine Russia’s quest for great power status throughout its history (Hopf, 2002Hopf, T. (2002). Social construction of international politics: Identities and foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]; Kanet, 2007Kanet, R. E. (2007). Russia: Re-emerging great power. Palgrave Macmillan. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]; Neumann, 2014Neumann, I. B. (2014). Status is cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians seek great-power status. In T. V. Paul, D. Welch Larson, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), Status in world politics (pp. 85–114). Cambridge University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]) and “identify status-seeking as the primary motive behind Russian foreign policy” (Heller, 2014Heller, R. (2014). Russia’s quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3–4), 333–343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.001 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]; Schmitt, 2020Schmitt, O. (2020). How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations. European Journal of International Relations, 26(3), 922–946. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119886024 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 924). Many associate Russian foreign policy since the mid-2000s specifically with the goal of (re)gaining great power status (Nitoiu, 2017Nitoiu, C. (2017). Aspirations to great power status: Russia’s path to assertiveness in the international arena under Putin. Political Studies Review, 15(1), 39–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929915623967 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Building upon these studies, this article focuses on two key principles in Russia’s post-Cold War great power identity: the promotion of multipolarity (a world order based on multiple centers of power) and Russia’s equal participation in global governance (the desire to be recognized as an equal player, especially by other great powers) (Lo, 2002Lo, B. (2002). Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: Reality, illusion and mythmaking. Palgrave Macmillan. [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 59). Both elements are integral to how the Russian leadership perceives the post-Cold War order and Russia’s place in it.

The promotion of multipolarity, often named polycentrism in Russian discourse, presents a world order of multiple powers rather than a unipolar world order dominated by the United States (Chebankova, 2017Chebankova, E. (2017). Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: Origins and main dimensions. Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(3), 217–234. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2017.1293394 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Locoman & Papa, 2021Locoman, E., & Papa, M. (2021). Transformation of alliances: Mapping Russia’s close relationships in the era of multivectorism. Contemporary Security Policy, 0(0), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1994692 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Google Scholar], p. 13). Many in the Russian elite believe that the world order has become multipolar and is no longer dominated by one hegemon. In their view, this multipolarity should be recognized by other states (Kortunov, 2019Kortunov, A. (2019). Between polycentrism and bipolarity: On Russia’s world order evolution narratives. Russia in Global Affairs, 17(1), 10–51. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2019-17-1-10-51 [Google Scholar]). In his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin stated “that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world” (Russian News Agency TASS, 2022TASS. (2022). Putin’s Munich Speech 15 years later: What prophecies have come true? https://tass.com/politics/1401215. [Google Scholar]). In 2019, he called the idea of a unipolar world an “illusion” which no longer exists (Russian News Agency TASS, 2019TASS. (2019). Путин назвал иллюзией однополярный мир. https://tass.ru/politika/7380485. [Google Scholar]), also noting that “the stubborn reluctance of a number of countries to accept this new [multipolar] reality” leads to increased confrontation and undermines strategic stability (RIA Novosti, 2019RIA Novosti. (2019). Путин назвал последствия нежелания стран признать многополярность мира. https://ria.ru/20190703/1556168743.html. [Google Scholar]).

Sovereignty takes center stage in the Russian conception of the multipolar order. The Russian view of multipolarity is heavily centered on the importance of non-interference and the possibility of conducting a foreign policy independent from outside influence (Averre & Davies, 2015Averre, D., & Davies, L. (2015). Russia, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: The case of Syria. International Affairs, 91(4), 813–834. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12343 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 824; UN News, 2017UN News. (2017). Russia’s Lavrov backs view on primacy of sovereignty in international relations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/566252-russias-lavrov-backs-view-primacy-sovereignty-international-relations. [Google Scholar]). Russia stands against what it sees as interference from a state or a certain group of states on the basis of their national interests, especially disguised as humanitarian or legal motives (German, 2020German, T. (2020). Harnessing protest potential: Russian strategic culture and the colored revolutions. Contemporary Security Policy, 41(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1757251 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Russian News Agency TASS, 2021bTASS. (2021b). Russia to defend principles of sovereignty and equality of states — Putin. https://tass.com/politics/1363447. [Google Scholar]). For instance, the Russian leadership associates many policies and practices pursued by the US and its allies, including military interventions justified with humanitarian goals, with the “erosion” and violation of sovereignty (Dagi, 2020Dagi, D. (2020). The Russian stand on the responsibility to protect: Does strategic culture matter? Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 7(3), 370–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797020962667 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Deyermond, 2016Deyermond, R. (2016). The uses of sovereignty in twenty-first century Russian foreign policy. Europe - Asia Studies, 68(6), 957–984. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1204985 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 963). One of the goals outlined in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept is to

counter politically motivated and self-interested attempts by some States to arbitrarily interpret the fundamental international legal norms and principles such as non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States … ; counter attempts to represent violations of international law as “creative” applications of such norms; counter attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of States with the aim of unconstitutional change of regime … (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK, 2016Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK. (2016). The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. https://www.rusemb.org.uk/rp_insight/. [Crossref], [Google Scholar])

In sum, multipolarity is an indispensable element of Russian great power identity because Russia perceives itself as being one of the “poles” and believes it holds a right to conduct its affairs without interference (Lo, 2015Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Brookings Institution Press. [Google Scholar], p. 48).

The second, and related, principle is Russia’s determination to be treated as an equal partner whose opinion matters in resolving world problems, as demonstrated in Lavrov’s quote above. Viewing itself as a great power which has not been recognized as one (Forsberg et al., 2014Forsberg, T., Heller, R., & Wolf, R. (2014). Status and emotions in Russian foreign policy. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3–4), 261–268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.007 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Malinova, 2014Malinova, O. (2014). Obsession with status and ressentiment: Historical backgrounds of the Russian discursive identity construction. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3-4), 291–303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.07.001 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), especially by Western states, Russia considers it critical to be affirmed as an equal participant in global governance, not just “any other member of an international institutions, but rather as a higher status member with rights equal to other great powers, including the United States” (Radin & Reach, 2017Radin, A., & Reach, C. (2017). Russian views of the international order. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/rr1826. [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 16). As Lavrov (2016Lavrov, S. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Historical background. Russia in Global Affairs, 14(2). https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-a-historical-perspective [Google Scholar]) also wrote,

I’d like to quote wise and politically experienced Henry Kissinger, who, speaking recently in Moscow, said that ‘Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States … I am here to argue for the possibility of a dialogue that seeks to merge our futures rather than elaborate our conflicts. This requires respect by both sides of the vital values and interest of the other.’ We share such an approach. And we will continue to defend the principles of law and justice in international affairs.

In the Russian leadership’s view, multipolarity is about equal treatment between the great powers. Being treated equally is a key element of its self-perception as an indispensable power. Often, the language used can be interpreted as Russia arguing for equality of all states. However, the principle of equality should be “seen as reflecting Russia’s great power identity, that Russia should be treated as equal to other great powers” (Eriksson & Privalov, 2021Eriksson, J., & Privalov, R. (2021). Russian space policy and identity: Visionary or reactionary? Journal of International Relations and Development, 24(2), 381–407. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-020-00195-8 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 392). Russia’s self-perception as a great power has been an important part of its identity throughout history, and especially since the end of the Cold War, as the “major objective which still preoccupies Russian minds is how to restore the country's ability to be an independent center of influence” (Lukyanov, 2010Lukyanov, F. (2010). Russian dilemmas in a multipolar world. Journal of International Affairs, 63(2), 19–32. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384332. [Google Scholar], p. 31). These beliefs, in combination with national security interests, often guide the Russian approach in international arms control and disarmament discussions. Fey et al. (2013Fey, M., Hellmann, A., Klinke, F., Plümmer, F., & Rauch, C. (2013). Established and rising great powers: The United States, Russia, China, and India. In H. Müller, & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Norm dynamics in multilateral arms control: Interests, conflicts, and justice (pp. 163–206). The University of Georgia Press. [Google Scholar]) note that Russia’s arms control policy “emphasizes equality of status,” especially with the United States. Russian nuclear disarmament policy is said to be based on the elites’ perception of nuclear parity with the US as a symbol of Russia’s “historical status as a great power on a par with the leading powers in the international system” (Clunan, 2009Clunan, A. (2009). The social construction of Russia’s resurgence: Aspirations, identity, and security interests. Johns Hopkins University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 189–190; Götz, 2019Götz, E. (2019). Strategic imperatives, status aspirations, or domestic interests? Explaining Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. International Politics, 56(6), 810–827. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0168-7 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]).

Mapping the Russian position on AWS

This section maps Russia’s evolving position on autonomous weapons, with a focus on how it views the global governance of AWS, the concept of human control, and technology more broadly. For each theme, I first summarize the Russian position, and then examine how Russian statements illustrate great power identity and rely on language related to this identity’s integral principles. The analysis is based on materials in Russian and English available through open-access sources, such as the UN digital recording system as well as the websites of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and relevant NGOs engaged in monitoring the AWS debate. I have gathered the data by going through all CCW meetings from 2013 to 2022 available through these sources, looking for written and verbal statements from the Russian Federation, and compiling them in a list. I have then read the written documents and listened to the audio recordings available online and selected the relevant statements related to the issue of AWS. The online appendix lists the sources used, which constitute Russia’s official position on AWS at the UN CCW.⁴4 The online appendix can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6457614 View all notes

The collected data has been interpreted to identify main patterns, themes, and ideas and situate them within the broader cultural-social context of the perception of Russia’s role in the world. While I did not look for specific terms such as “multipolarity” or “sovereignty,” I interpreted the “meanings, histories, contradictions and patterns in texts” representing the Russian position on AWS (Stone Tatum, 2018Stone Tatum, D. (2018). Discourse, genealogy and methods of text selection in international relations. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31(3–4), 344–364. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1518971 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Google Scholar], p. 346). As the data analysis is based on an interpretive research design, I do not argue for linear causality between Russian identity and its approach towards AWS (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2011Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2011). Interpretive research design: Concepts and processes. Routledge. [Google Scholar], pp. 52–53). Rather, the goal is to highlight how Russia’s self-perception and its related concepts guide the Russian position on AWS in addition to rationalist material factors which are explored elsewhere in the literature. presents some concrete examples associated with the principles in each of the themes explored in this section.

Table 1. Examples of statements associated with Russian great power identity.

Download CSV Display Table

The UN CCW debate

The most important international debate on autonomous weapons and concerns associated with the weaponization of AI has been taking place within the UN CCW framework. The purpose of the CCW is to “ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately.” It consists of the framework convention, which “contains general provisions on the operation, including rules on joining the regime and the possibility to negotiate and adopt new protocols,” as well as five protocols annexed to the convention which “contain the substantive prohibitions and restrictions on certain types of weapons” (UNODA, n.d.UNODA. (n.d.). The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons. [Google Scholar]). In 2016, the 125 CCW high contracting parties (states which have signed and ratified the convention) took the decision to formalize the discussion in the GGE format. The GGE sessions bring together diplomatic, military, legal, and technical experts from states parties as well as international institutions, NGOs, civil society, and academia.

Throughout the years, several main themes have emerged from this debate. First, there is disagreement on the necessity for a new international regulation to govern the development and use of autonomous weapons. Approximately 30 states, with the support of civil society actors, argue for a global ban on “killer robots” and have called for beginning negotiations on new legally binding legislation within the CCW (Human Rights Watch, 2020aHuman Rights Watch. (2020a). Stopping killer robots: Country positions on banning fully autonomous weapons and retaining human control. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and#_ftn5. [Google Scholar]). Another group of states parties, which includes Russia, the United States, India, and Israel, believes that it is premature to talk about new regulations, arguing that AWS do not yet exist (Acheson, 2021aAcheson, R. (2021a). Editorial: CCW struggles. CCW Report, 9(5), 1–2. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2021/prepcom/reports/CCWR9.5.pdf. [Google Scholar], p. 1). Second, there is an ongoing discussion about human-machine interaction and the concept of control, often characterized as meaningful human control, and when and where it should be applied (Crootof, 2015Crootof, R. (2015). The killer robots are here: Legal and policy implications. Cardozo Law Review, 36(5), 1837–1915. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534567. [Google Scholar], p. 1900; Horowitz & Scharre, 2015Horowitz, M. C., & Scharre, P. (2015). Meaningful human control in weapon systems: A primer. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/meaningful-human-control-in-weapon-systems-a-primer. [Google Scholar]). Third, participants in the debate interpret the context of AWS in different ways, depending on the perceptions of technology and its role in society. There is a division between those who perceive the development of AWS as an inevitable process (Bode & Huelss, 2022Bode, I., & Huelss, H. (2022). Autonomous weapons systems and international norms. McGill-Queen’s University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 36–37), and those who see potential in human control over technology and how it is used in warfare (Acheson, 2021bAcheson, R. (2021b). Editorial: Convergence against killer robots. CCW Report, 9(3), 1–3. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2021/gge/reports/CCWR9.3.pdf. [Google Scholar], p. 2).

Despite such differences, in 2019 the GGE adopted eleven principles guiding the perception of technologies in the area of LAWS (UNODA, 2019UNODA. (2019). Report of the 2019 session of the group of governmental experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CCW_GGE.1_2019_3_E.pdf. [Google Scholar]). At the sixth CCW review conference in December 2021, the high contracting parties have agreed to extend the mandate of the GGE, asking the group to, once again, “consider proposals and elaborate, by consensus, possible measures … related to the normative and operational framework” on LAWS (CCW Review Conference, 2021CCW Review Conference. (2021). Report of main committee II. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2021/RevCon/documents/MCII-rev3.pdf. [Google Scholar]). At the time of writing, no further concrete measures have been adopted by the states parties. Overall, the polarization and disagreements characterizing the GGE debate, as well as consensus-based decision-making, make any potentially new regulation on AWS challenging, if not impossible (Akimoto, 2019Akimoto, D. (2019). International regulation of “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS): Paradigms of policy debate in Japan. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 7(2), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.18588/201911.00a079 [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 324). To explore the potential for arms control on autonomous weapons understanding the position of Russia, one of the most active states parties, is key.

Russia and the global governance of AWS

Russia’s consistent position at the GGE debate has been to oppose new regulations of AWS, be it a legally binding treaty, a political declaration, an additional protocol to the CCW, or even “soft” measures such as a code of conduct (November 16, 2017 11:12:13; April 9, 2018 12:43:48; March 27, 2019 15:57:32; 14 November, 2019 10:19:43; August 3, 2021 12:06:22). Russian language demonstrates suspicion and sometimes even hostility towards delegations arguing for a ban on AWS. In 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it has “significant doubts” regarding the position of “radically-oriented” actors who argue that existing international law is not enough to regulate AWS (Chernenko, 2018Chernenko, E. (2018). Автомат с «калашниковым». Kommersant. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3714419?from=doc_vrez. [Google Scholar]). Russia’s main argument is that current international humanitarian law (IHL) provisions are sufficient and do not need to be adapted or modernized in connection with technological developments, as “restrictions and principles deriving from IHL apply to all types of weapons without exception, including LAWS” (Russian Federation, 2021bRussian Federation. (2021b). Considerations for the report of the group of governmental experts of the high contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://undocs.org/ccw/gge.1/2021/wp.1. [Google Scholar], para. 3). Another argument underpinning the Russian position is that it is premature to discuss regulation as fully autonomous weapons do not yet exist and do not have a widely accepted definition (Russian Federation, 2017cRussian Federation. (2017c). Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2017/gge/documents/WP8.pdf. [Google Scholar], para. 6; 2021b, para. 9). Due to what it sees as the “lack of working samples of LAWS” (2017c, para. 6), Russia has often characterized the GGE debate as “speculative discussions divorced from reality” (Russian Federation, 2018Russian Federation. (2018). Russia’s approaches to the elaboration of a working definition and basic functions of lethal autonomous weapons systems in the context of the purposes and objectives of the convention. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/%0Adocuments/%0ADisarmament-fora/ccw/2018/gge/documents/GGE.1-WP6-English.pdf%0A. [Google Scholar], para. 2). Russian delegations use terms and phrases highlighting the perceived inexistence of these systems, such as “potential LAWS” (November 16, 2017 18:06:35; March 25, 2019 12:01:19) or “so-called LAWS” (Russian Federation, 2020Russian Federation. (2020). National implementation of the guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://perma.cc/Z67Q-5J5N. [Google Scholar], p. 5). In their view, there are no valid examples of challenges brought by AWS because there is no proof that they exist (March 26, 2019 11:24:59; August 4, 2021 10:47:06; August 9, 2021 15:57:04). Even if they existed, these weapons would be sufficiently regulated by existing IHL norms (August 4, 2021 15:11:13; August 5, 2021 16:07:34). Russia is part of a small group of states insisting on defining AWS, while most other state parties either suggest that a working definition is not necessary or agree that a definition should focus on the capability of selecting and engaging targets autonomously (Rafferty, 2021Rafferty, J. (2021). Characteristics of autonomous weapons. CCW Report, 9(3), 9–12. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2021/gge/reports/CCWR9.3.pdf. [Google Scholar]).

The promotion of multipolarity emerges through Russia’s worries about the potential politicization of the debate on the governance of AWS. Russian statements argue that the AWS issue should be examined in a “careful, balanced and considered manner, taking into account both humanitarian concerns and legitimate defense interests of states” (2017c, para. 14; 2018, para. 5; 2021b, para. 10; April 12, 2016 15:45:20; November 16, 2017 11:12:13). Russia fears that this balance, which the CCW is based on, might be disrupted by adopting a definition of LAWS which politicizes the debate (November 15, 2017 10:35:10; April 10, 2018 15:54:41; March 25, 2019 12:01:19). Its 2018 working paper states that:

any attempts to find a working definition of LAWS should not lead to a division of the weapons under discussion into ‘bad’ and ‘good’ ones, in other words, should not allow the division of such weapons into groups and categories based on the political preferences of a particular group of States. (para.6; see also August 4, 2021 10:47:06)

Moreover, Russian statements feature worries about humanitarian concerns used as pretext to ban LAWS: “The principles of humanity, the dictates of public conscience, as well as the human rights dimension cannot be used as the absolute and sole sufficient condition to impose restrictive and prohibitive regimes on certain types of weapons” (2021bRussian Federation. (2021b). Considerations for the report of the group of governmental experts of the high contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://undocs.org/ccw/gge.1/2021/wp.1. [Google Scholar], para. 4). This fear of politicization, especially based upon humanitarian concerns, is also present in Russia’s position towards the arms control of other types of conventional weapons. For instance, the head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Yermakov told the meeting of high contracting parties in 2014, “We are still convinced that ‘humanitarian threats’ related to the use of [mines other than anti-personnel] are irrelevant and biased” (Russian Federation, 2014Russian Federation. (2014). Statement by Mr. Vladimir Yermakov, head of delegation of the Russian Federation, at the meeting of high contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. https://perma.cc/49UU-JUP3. [Google Scholar], p.3). Similarly, Yermakov said in 2017 that the Cluster Munitions Convention “is a politicized document that tailors the very definition of [cluster munitions] to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages” (Russian Federation, 2017bRussian Federation. (2017b). Statement by the representative of the Russian Federation to the first committee of the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly Vladimir Yermakov in the first committee on “Conventional Weapons” cluster. https://perma.cc/YD26-PYSH. [Google Scholar], p. 3, see also 2017cRussian Federation. (2017c). Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2017/gge/documents/WP8.pdf. [Google Scholar], para. 10). In the Russian view, working on a definition of AWS should be the priority as it would “ensure that the interests of the maximum number of states are taken into account,” suggesting the importance of giving equal consideration to everyone, especially itself (April 12, 2016 15:45:20).

Such language reflects Russia’s concerns about global governance being monopolized by the interests of one state, or a small group of states, without taking others’ (and its) interests into account. Russia’s statements on the potential politicization of AWS demonstrate the importance that it attributes to its position being taken into consideration as an equal participant in the multipolar world order. They also reflect its broader strategies adopted in other multilateral negotiations and represent Russia’s fear of being sidelined in a crucial security and arms control discussion, consistent with Russian diplomats being “angry” when they are not seen as “indispensable” (Schmitt, 2020Schmitt, O. (2020). How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations. European Journal of International Relations, 26(3), 922–946. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119886024 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 940). Russian officials often view arms control negotiations, including the one on AWS, through the “anti-Russian prism,” where regulations seem to restrict Russia’s right to defend itself and pursue its independent foreign policy, which is a key element of its self-perception as a great power (Kozyulin, 2019bKozyulin, V. (2019b). Смертоносные автономные системы вооружений: проблемы современного международно-правового регулирования и перспективы их решения. Журнал Международная Жизнь [International Affairs Journal]. https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2152?fbclid=IwAR0K6UZ9aKw4oKuXhMf1uq7zj t0_ooAEpOpRemY_O8HslVWl9AYWTqFpBM8. [Google Scholar]).

Russia and human control

Just as all other CCW states parties, Russia agrees that a weapon system should not operate fully autonomously. It has consistently confirmed its commitment “to the need to maintain human control over the so-called LAWS, no matter how ‘advanced’ these systems may be” (2021b, para. 11) and stated that it does “not doubt the necessity of maintaining human control over the machine” (2018, para. 11; 2020, p. 2; 2021b, para. 11; April 11, 2018 11:14:38; March 26, 2019 16:00:32). At the same time, throughout the years of the GGE, Russia has demonstrated a sovereignty-based approach towards human control, where “specific forms and methods of [human control] should be left to the discretion of States” (2018, para. 12; 2019, para. 7; 2021b, para. 11). Russia believes there is not only one way to ensure compliance with IHL and “not only direct operation can ensure effective human control over the machine” (2021bRussian Federation. (2021b). Considerations for the report of the group of governmental experts of the high contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://undocs.org/ccw/gge.1/2021/wp.1. [Google Scholar], para. 11). It has also been skeptical to attempts of determining a common definition of standards of human control, arguing that:

In ensuring these functions [autonomous functions entrusted to machines] states should rely on their own standards in this sphere. Attempts to develop certain universal parameters of the so-called critical functions for both existing highly automated weapons systems and future LAWS—aim identification and hit command, maintaining “significant” human control—can hardly lead to practical results. (emphasis as in original Russian, 2018, para. 9)

While Russia has previously admitted that the concept of meaningful human control could be potentially useful for the GGE debate (2017b, para. 12), its position has evolved into becoming doubtful about how this term might be misinterpreted or misused for specific political purposes (April 11, 2018 11:14:38). In 2019, Russia argued that concepts such as meaningful human control or a degree of human involvement “are based on purely subjective assessments and are not related to law” (November 14, 2019 10:19:43; see also March 25, 2019 15:39:42). The Russian representative noted that determining the level of “meaningfulness” or “significance” of human control would be “purely subjective” and “in the right hands, the concept could become an instrument for the implementation of narrowly focused national interests” (March 26, 2019 16:00:32; August 4, 2021 15:11:13). Similarly, in 2021, Russia said that these two concepts, “promoted by a number of countries and generally not relevant to the law, are only fraught with the risk of politicizing the discussion” (2021b, para. 12). The Russian representative further said that “it is individual states who must decide on their own how they will determine this [human] control, because these states and citizens of these states have full responsibility of the development and use of these technologies” (September 27, 2021 11:38:06). Russia’s insistence on human control being defined by states demonstrates the importance of sovereignty and non-interference into states’ domestic military affairs and highlights Russia’s concern with some states monopolizing concepts without taking others—especially its—interests into consideration. The Russian approach towards human control in the AWS debate is thus guided by key principles in its self-perception of great power: the quest to be recognized as equal to other great powers and conduct a sovereign policy in a multipolar world.

Russian perceptions of technology

The evolving Russian position presents technology in a positive light, in contrast to fully autonomous weapons, which it portrays as potentially problematic. Russia points out that it is important for the GGE discussion to center on AWS rather than technologies, because “on the battlefield, specific weapons systems are used, not technologies” (August 20, 2019 10:26:27; August 21, 2019 16:44:46 and 17:53:50). Yet, the Russian Federation states it “cannot agree with the alarmist assessments predicting that fully autonomous weapons systems will inevitably emerge in the coming years” (Russian Federation, 2017aRussian Federation. (2017a). Statement by the Russian delegation on agenda item 8 of the meeting of the states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. https://perma.cc/6N34-G2X3. [Google Scholar], p. 1). Contradicting its own calls for leaving existing weapons with autonomous features out of the discussion (2018, para. 9; April 10, 2018 11:25:28), Russia often mentions examples of existing applications of weaponized AI and autonomy and highlights their benefits, such as their perceived “important role in addressing the tasks of defense, combatting terrorist threats, mitigating mine danger and so on” (Russian Federation, 2019Russian Federation. (2019). Potential opportunities and limitations of military uses of lethal autonomous weapons systems. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2019/gge/Documents/GGE.2-WP1.pdf. [Google Scholar], paras. 1–2; 2021aRussian Federation. (2021a). To understanding the characteristics of the LAWS relevant to the aims and objectives of the Convention. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/To-understanding-the-characteristics-of-the-LAWS-.pdf. [Google Scholar]; April 11, 2018 11:14:38; March 25, 2019 12:01:19; August 4, 2021 16:34:48). Its 2021 written statement notes that:

LAWS technologies can significantly reduce the negative impact of weapons in the context of IHL related to the operator’s errors, his/her mental or physiological state, and ethical, religious or moral values. They can reduce the likelihood of unintentional attacks against civilians and civilian objects. (2021b, para. 7)

The Russian position thus presents autonomy and automation in a positive light and creates a distance between the “potential LAWS” that do not yet exist and the perceived benefits of existing technologies (Boulanin et al., 2020Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Carlsson, M. P. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/other-publications/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk. [Google Scholar], pp. 47–48).

Russian delegations have consistently argued that the work of the GGE should not affect states’ abilities to develop technologies such as AI and robotics, stating that the group “should not ignore potential benefits of [autonomous weapons] systems in the context of ensuring States’ national security” (2019, para. 10). Russia adopts a sovereignty-based approach, highlighting the importance of non-interference in states’ pursuit of security interests. It believes that “it is hardly acceptable for the work on LAWS to restrict the freedom to enjoy the benefits of autonomous technologies being the future of humankind” (2018, para. 7). On this point, the Russian discourse is similar to the arguments put forward by other delegations, including AI developers such as the United States, Japan, China, and Israel (Haner & Garcia, 2019Haner, J., & Garcia, D. (2019). The artificial intelligence arms race: Trends and world leaders in autonomous weapons development. Global Policy, 10(3), 331–337. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12713 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Human Rights Watch, 2020aHuman Rights Watch. (2020a). Stopping killer robots: Country positions on banning fully autonomous weapons and retaining human control. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and#_ftn5. [Google Scholar]). Representatives of member states such as France, Germany, and India, have also expressed concerns about the debate on AWS affecting the view of technology in general, by, for instance, “demonizing” it (Acheson, 2021bAcheson, R. (2021b). Editorial: Convergence against killer robots. CCW Report, 9(3), 1–3. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2021/gge/reports/CCWR9.3.pdf. [Google Scholar], p. 2). The difference, however, is that many of these delegations also argue for the need to reach a GGE consensus on a normative-operational framework on AWS, either in the form of a “clear commitment” to human control (France and Germany, 2021France and Germany. (2021). Franco-German contribution: Outline for a normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. UNODA. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/France-and-Germany.pdf. [Google Scholar]), a guide of best practices (Australia et al., 2021Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (2021). Discussion paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. UNODA. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Australia-Canada-Japan-United-Kingdom-United-States.pdf. [Google Scholar]) or “code of conduct” (The Guardian, 2021The Guardian. (2021). US rejects calls for regulating or banning ‘killer robots.’ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/02/us-rejects-calls-regulating-banning-killer-robots. [Google Scholar]). Meanwhile, the Russian Federation is becoming increasingly isolated in its argument that there are not yet any reasons for adopting any kind of new framework on AWS.

The promotion of multipolarity features in Russia’s insistence that states have the right to interpret technology in a positive light, and that “when elaborating the definition of LAWS, one should avoid making hasty decisions ‘cementing’ technological advancement” (2018, para. 2). Its calls for the definition of AWS to involve a high number of experts working in different areas and “the principle of equitable geographical representation” to be respected also shows that Russia likes to emphasize equal consideration of all opinions, hinting at the Russian leadership’s opposition to a unipolar world dominated by the United States and its allies (2018, para. 8). Russia also shows a concern with the politicization of technology for the sake of narrow interests which do not take into account the positions of other actors. Its 2021 written statement called for the GGE to avoid “hasty decisions that could hinder technological progress and undermine the ongoing research in the field of peaceful robotics and AI,” adding, “it is important to bear in mind that views on and attitudes towards technology in society may change over time, as more experience is gained in its application” (2021b, para. 6; see also March 25, 2019 15:39:42; March 26, 2019 11:24:59). Arguing to prevent decisions that would threaten “technological progress,” Russia does not want the GGE to adopt a framework on AWS that would set in stone a certain perception of technology which it does not agree with (November 14, 2019 10:19:43).

Through this analysis, I demonstrate that the conception of Russia as a great power equal to other “poles” of power in the multipolar world has guided the Russian evolving position on AWS at the UN. The language used in Russian statements to the CCW is rooted in two integral elements of Russian great power identity: first, the self-perception of one of the centers of power in a multipolar world (promotion of multipolarity), and second, a desire to be recognized as equal to other great powers, often disguised in claims about equality for everyone (equal participation in global affairs).

Conclusion

Advances in the spheres of AI and robotics are raising concerns about the applications of these technologies in warfare and the increasing level of autonomy in weapons systems. While technology is developing, international regulation is not, and the Russian Federation is one of the states associated with the lack of progress at the UN CCW. This article investigated the Russian evolving position with the main objective to go beyond rationalist analyses which assume that Russia is against any new regulation on AWS for strategic or material purposes. While not dismissing these arguments, I adopted a constructivist perspective to understand the full depth of Russia’s position, especially how it has been guided by the Russian leadership’s perception of Russia as a great power in the modern world order. My interpretation of Russian statements at the CCW suggests that the Russian leadership’s beliefs about Russia’s place in the world has made it possible to hold these views in the global debate on autonomous weapons (Budnitsky, 2020Budnitsky, S. (2020). Russia’s great power imaginary and pursuit of digital multipolarity. Internet Policy Review, 9(3), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.3.1492 [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], pp. 3–4). Russian great power identity has a role in enabling this position via two integral elements: First, that Russia perceives itself as one of the centers of power in a multipolar world, and second, that it perceives itself as equal to other great powers and pursues equal participation for itself in global affairs and especially arms control negotiations (Fey et al., 2013Fey, M., Hellmann, A., Klinke, F., Plümmer, F., & Rauch, C. (2013). Established and rising great powers: The United States, Russia, China, and India. In H. Müller, & C. Wunderlich (Eds.), Norm dynamics in multilateral arms control: Interests, conflicts, and justice (pp. 163–206). The University of Georgia Press. [Google Scholar]).

The Russian Federation fears that the debate on the governance of AWS will be politicized without taking its interests into consideration, contributing to its feeling of not being recognized and respected as an equal great power in the modern multipolar world. Moreover, Russia’s argument that human control in the use of force must be set by states according to their own standards expresses the importance it attributes to sovereignty and the ability to make independent decisions in the development of military applications of AI. Finally, the conception of technology and AI as a positive force in the Russian discourse showcases the perceived importance of avoiding making technology a political issue and taking hasty decisions on technologies without taking everyone’s (and especially Russian) interests into consideration.

The article does not dismiss rationalist-based arguments that Russia is motivated by strategic concerns or material gains. Rather, it complements these analyses by exploring deeper ideational and identity-based factors underpinning the Russian position. A constructivist-based interpretation indicates the value of considering socio-cultural contexts behind states’ positions on arms control and regulation of AWS. It provides a more thorough understanding of Russia’s motivations, which is key in a forum like the CCW, where decisions are taken by consensus and compromise between different positions is necessary. To understand potential next steps towards international regulations and limitations on autonomy in weapons systems, campaigners should have the full picture of different states’ positions. Future research could therefore consider the ideational contexts guiding the positions of other CCW states parties.

This analysis offers some insights on the ways forward in the debate on AWS. The deeply rooted factors directing Russia’s position make the latter more intractable and challenging to resolve. The CCW review conference in December 2021 and the GGE meeting in March 2022 have not led to substantive results in terms of moving towards international regulations of AWS. If the debate continues in a similar way, Russia is likely to maintain its strict opposition to any initiative it sees as infringing upon its self-recognition as an equal great power. Russia’s position would remain difficult to change, not only due to Russian strategic interests, but also due to the beliefs about Russia’s place in the world guiding its perception of regulations of AWS. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent developments have exacerbated the tensions preventing the discussion from moving forward. At the first GGE meeting in 2022, the Russian delegation opposed holding most of the session in a formal format and prevented progress by focusing on procedural matters. It claimed that it was put into a “discriminatory position” (March 7, 2022 10:20:42) by some of the restrictions imposed by the European Union (EU) and that it would block any substantive questions, de facto stalling the GGE debate (March 8, 2022 10:46:18).

In light of recent developments, civil society organizations have become more active in arguing for the need to pursue an alternative venue or process outside of the CCW or even outside of the UN (Acheson, 2022Acheson, R. (2022). We will not weaponise our way out of horror. CCW Report, 10(2), 1–5. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2022/gge/reports/CCWR10.2.pdf [Google Scholar]; Noor, 2022Noor, O. (2022). Discussions at UN on autonomous weapon systems blocked by Russia, but states indicate way forward. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/discussions-at-un-on-autonomous-weapon-systems-blocked-by-russia-but-states-indicate-way-forward/. [Google Scholar]). Activists and scholars point to the cases of previous successful weapon bans as examples of paths that the debate on AWS could follow (Human Rights Watch, 2020bHuman Rights Watch. (2020b). New weapons, proven precedent: Elements of and models for a treaty on killer robots. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/20/new-weapons-proven-precedent/elements-and-models-treaty-killer-robots. [Google Scholar]). Such cases include the processes which have resulted in the ban of cluster munitions (the Oslo process), anti-personnel mines (the Ottawa process), as well as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by majority vote at the UN General Assembly in 2017 (Bode & Huelss, 2022Bode, I., & Huelss, H. (2022). Autonomous weapons systems and international norms. McGill-Queen’s University Press. [Google Scholar]). It is unlikely that Russia would join such a process, were it to go forward. First, Russian statements have been consistent in claiming that the discussion on AWS should continue within the GGE format “based on the discussion mandate and the agreed agenda” (2021b, para. 18). Russia believes that the CCW is

a forum where decisions are discussed and adopted on the basis of a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defense interests of States. It is this particular feature of the forum that provides a practical opportunity to analyze such a contradictory and controversial subject as LAWS with realism and due prudence. (2018, para. 2)

The Russian leadership attributes great importance to this balance, as its self-perception as a great power in a multipolar world has led it to be suspicious of unilateral initiatives based on humanitarian arguments and what it sees as politicized definitions of AWS. Second, given that the CCW’s consensus principle allows Russia to block proposals it considers as infringing upon its views, it is unlikely to engage in a process which does not reserve it these privileges, whether at the CCW or elsewhere. Russian statements often highlight that the debate should only move forward based on consensus (see August 7, 2021 15:57:04; August 10, 2021 16:53:54; December 3, 2021 10:27:59). Just like its veto power at the UN Security Council, the principle of consensus at the CCW contributes to Russia’s perception of itself as a great power.

One option for civil society actors and states who seek to pursue the ban of AWS within the CCW context would be to slightly shift the focus of their campaign away from the “humanitarian framing” which includes legal and ethical implications of the development and use of AWS (Rosert & Sauer, 2021Rosert, E., & Sauer, F. (2021). How (not) to stop the killer robots: A comparative analysis of humanitarian disarmament campaign strategies. Contemporary Security Policy, 42(1), 4–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 22). As demonstrated above, Russian policymakers consider humanitarian concerns in relation to certain weapons unjustified and fear the politicization of ethical worries such as arguments that autonomous weapons inherently violate human dignity (Asaro, 2012Asaro, P. (2012). On banning autonomous weapon systems: Human rights, automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making. International Review of the Red Cross, 94(886), 687–709. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000768 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). One way in which the debate could be reframed is by highlighting the need to regulate AWS for reasons of global security and stability (Altmann & Sauer, 2017Altmann, J., & Sauer, F. (2017). Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability. Survival, 59(5), 117–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Alwardt and Schörnig (2022Alwardt, C., & Schörnig, N. (2022). A necessary step back? Recovering the security perspective in the debate on lethal autonomy. Zeitschrift Für Friedens- Und Konfliktforschung, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42597-021-00067-z. [Google Scholar]), for instance, argue for a “more fundamental shift towards an arms control- and security-based argument that focuses on the major players” (p. 3). Such an approach would also focus on the technical challenges posed by AWS, including malfunctions of AI, issues with datasets (Holland Michel, 2021Holland Michel, A. (2021). Known unkowns: Data issues and military autonomous systems. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. https://unidir.org/known-unknowns. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]) and vulnerability to hacking (Sharikov, 2018Sharikov, P. (2018). Artificial intelligence, cyberattack, and nuclear weapons—A dangerous combination. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(6), 368–373. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533185 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Technical concerns in turn raise security-related challenges affecting global stability, including crisis escalation, proliferation of weapons with autonomy, and impacts on nuclear deterrence (Horowitz, 2019Horowitz, M. C. (2019). When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), 764–788. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621174 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). This focus would resonate more with Russian policymakers and their conception of Russia as a great power in a multipolar world, and a guarantor of global security on par with the other nuclear powers.

A treaty or legally binding commitment to ban AWS outside of the CCW, without the participation of Russia or other major developers of related technologies, is another scenario. Despite the probability of Russia not joining such negotiations, a possible regulation would possess normative benefits. It could set “new standards of appropriate behavior” on the development and use of AWS which would make it “more difficult” for developer states such as Russia to produce, use, transfer and proliferate these technologies, with the potential to “de-legitimize these arms over time” (Bode, 2021Bode, I. (2021). Reflecting on the future norms of warfare. AutoNorms. https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare/. [Google Scholar]; Borrie, 2014Borrie, J. (2014). Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban. International Affairs, 90(3), 625–646. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12130 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 626). Russia is one of the key actors consistently maintaining its opposition to any kind of new regulation on AWS. Nevertheless, previous examples of weapon bans suggest that Russia or other developers of military technology perceiving themselves as great powers cannot “continually block progress” in arms control (Borrie, 2014Borrie, J. (2014). Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban. International Affairs, 90(3), 625–646. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12130 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 646) and prevent normative developments on what is considered appropriate in warfare.